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OWNERSHIP OF GOODS SHIPPED UNDER A BILL OF LADING
TO THE SELLER'S ORDER
SAMUEL WILLISTON t
In the May number of this REVIEW, 1 there is a note on Gerde-Newman
& Co. v. Louisiana Stores, Inc.,2 and the decision of the court is made the
basis of a criticism of Section 20 of the Uniform Sales Act. That Act is
not in force in Louisiana, but that particular section, as noted in the discus-
sion of the case, is identical with Section 40 of the Uniform Bills of Lading
Act which is in force in Louisiana, and was involved in the decision.
The provision in both Acts is:
"Where the goods are shipped by the bill of lading the goods are
deliverable to the seller or his agent, the seller thereby reserves the prop-
erty in the goods. But if, except for the form of the bill of lading, the
property would have passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the
seller's property in the goods shall be deemed to be only for the purpose
of securing performance by the buyer under the contract." 3
The Sales Act is in force in a considerable majority of the states, includ-
ing those of most commercial importance and a correct understanding of the
meaning of the section is of such importance that no unnecessary doubt
should cloud it. I was the draftsman of both Acts, and, as such, I am not
only interested in their interpretation, but am able at least to state the result
that the section was intended to bring about; and though this intent may have
been so badly expressed that the purpose failed, the intent has at least
I A. B., 1882, A. M., 1888, LL. B., 1888, LL D., 191o, Harvard University; Dane Pro-
fessor of Law, Harvard University; author of THE LAiw OF CONTRACTS (1920) ; THE LAW
OF SALES (2d ed. 1924), and of other treatises; contributor to legal periodicals.
1 (I933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 885.
2 144 So. 756 (La. App. 1932).
'UNIFORM SALES ACT § 20 (2) ; UNIFORM BILLS ov LADING AT § 40 (b). The Sales
Act has been enacted in 33 jurisdictions; the Bills of Lading Act in 29.
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academic interest. Moreover, I am unwilling to admit that the section is
not clear enough to convey the intended meaning. I have written on the
subject before,4 but not elaborately, and some cases pertinent to the matter
have been decided since my treatise was written. I make the criticism that
I have referred to above the text, to some extent, for the present examination
of the section.
The question involved relates to a method of shipment very commonly
employed, namely, a shipment by a seller of goods consigned to the buyer's
town under a bill of lading to the seller's own order.5 The seller habitually
notifies the buyer of the shipment, and the bill of lading, which ordinarily
contains a direction to the carrier to notify the buyer of the arrival of the
goods at destination, is then sent forward to a bank in the buyer's town with
a draft for the price attached. The bank notifies the buyer of the receipt
of the documents, and on payment of the draft by the buyer surrenders to
him the bill of lading by means of which he then obtains the goods from
the carrier.
The obvious purpose of this common method of doing business is to
enable the seller to retain a hold on the goods until the draft has been paid,
and that he does retain some hold on the goods is unquestionably law. It is
only the nature and extent of the interest that he retains that is in question.
The English cases before the enactment of the Sale of Goods Act made use
of the term jus disponendi to indicate that interest, and the translation of
this expression has been retained in the English Sale of Goods Act. As the
expression itself indicates, the seller by virtue of a bill of lading in this form
can dispose of the goods. He can do so although it will violate his contract
with the buyer," and, a fortiori, he can do so if the buyer refuses to carry
out the contract. Other possible questions, however, are left unanswered by
the term itself, and the matter is not helped by the cautious words of the
codifying statute that the seller is "prima facie deemed to reserve the right
to dispose." 7
A statement of the exact meaning intended by the words "isus dis-
ponendi" or "right to dispose" has never been judicially attempted. Some-
thing less than title or "the property in the goods" is vaguely adumbrated
or one of those familiar expressions used elsewhere in the statute would have
been used; but how much less can not be guessed. This uncertainty is multi-
plied by another by the use of the words "prima facie". Possible doubt
always exists, because of these words, whether the seller retains any right.
'WILLISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) 305. See also Note (1929) 29 CoI. L. REv. xIoo; Note
(i922) 22 COL. L. REv. 462.
' The situation is the same so far as the matters here discussed are concerned if the goods
are consigned to the seller by a straight bill. This method, however, is not so convenient or
common, since the seller often wishes to negotiate the document for security and must always
make some arrangement for its transfer to the buyer at the place of destination.
'Wait v. Baker, 2 Ex. I (1848) ; WILISTON, SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 283, n. 17.
" English SALE OF GOODS Acr, 56 & 57 VICT. c. 71, § 19 (2) (1893).
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Fortunately, the good sense of the English court has generally enabled it
to achieve desirable mercantile results, but neither the wording of the statute
nor the judicial language that the draftsman of the statute followed gives
much aid in reaching those results.
The vital questions are: On whom is the risk of loss in transit? Can
the seller recover the price of the goods if the buyer refuses to carry out
the bargain, or is recovery of damages based on the difference between
the contract and market price the only remedy? What is the effect of bank-
ruptcy of either party? If on tender by the buyer of payment of the draft
or price, surrender of the bill of lading is wrongfully refused, is it a viola-
tion of a property right of the buyer, or merely of a contractual right?
The conception that there is no further inquiry to be made in regard to
any of these matters than whether "title" has passed is doubtless prevalent.
The idea that title is always the same and always carries with it identical
consequences s is instinctive with many lawyers, easy as it is to demonstrate
the contrary. Title to land can be and is frequently transferred or retained
merely for security. There is no reason why chattel property should not be
dealt with in the same way.
The conception of divided ownership was doubtless almost entirely the
creation of courts of equity derived from their compulsion of owners to deal
with their ownership according to good conscience. But this desirable and
convenient conception has been taken over into the law in many cases and
remedies at law are often adequate to achieve results originally reached only
in equity. Illustrations might be multiplied. A fraudulent buyer of a chattel
acquires ownership but the defrauded seller need not now seek rescission
in equity, but may sue for conversion. Nevertheless, following the equitable
doctrine, courts of law protect an innocent purchaser for value from the
fraudulent buyer. In closer analogy to the situation under discussion a
bill or note indorsed as collateral for a debt or corporate stock may be trans-
ferred to a creditor for the same purpose. It cannot be denied that the
creditor acquires what is called legal title, but it is equally clear that there
are limitations on his ownership. Land or chattels may also be conveyed in
absolute terms but extrinsic evidence may show that the transfer was only
' It has been pointed out that "title" is something variable in different cases, since its
possessors do not always have the same legal relations to other persons. This is doubtless a
sound juristic conception, but it is practically impossible always to state specifically what
rights, powers, privileges and immunities an owner has in a particular case. For one reason,
the intrinsic difficulty and complication of such a mode of statement render it impossible of
universal application. Lawyers must have some shorter mode of expression. Furthermore,
the lengthened statement requires at the outset a knowledge of all these rights, powers, privi-
leges and immunities. This is impossible. Those who suggest it fail to take into account the
way the law has grown, and apparently is growing, namely, by first determining the attribute
of ownership or title and then deducing consequences therefrom. It is at least possible, how-
ever, without imposing too elaborate terminology on a practical profession, to distinguish
from full ownership not only the bare title that an ordinary trustee has, but a title held merely
for purposes of security.
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for the purpose of security. And, as the transfer of a legal title may be
subject to an interest remaining in the transferror, so the retention of a legal
title may be qualified by interests transferred to others.
When goods are transferred either by a conditional sale or by an abso-
lute transfer with a mortgage back there is this feature of divided owner-
ship. The device of retaining title by a bill of lading to the seller's order has
the same purpose as the conditional sale and is dealt with in the Uniform
Sales Act with respect to risk of loss in the same way. 9
In the Sales Act, and also in the Bills of Lading Act, it was my purpose
as draftsman, and I think I may say the purpose of the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws for whom I was acting, to settle the problem of divided
ownership in the situation under consideration as unequivocally as the nature
of the case permitted. The effect that was intended by the provision in both
Acts-an intention that it is the purpose of these remarks to show has been
carried out-was to provide that always, and not merely prima facie, when
a bill of lading is taken in this form the seller retains the property in the
goods,10 but that wherever the only ground for stating that the property is
reserved is the form of the bill of lading, the property is held merely for
security, like ownership under a mortgage at common law, or the seller's
ownership under a conditional sale, or like the ownership that a bank or other
creditor has of negotiable collateral indorsed to it for the purpose of security.
Prior to the enactment of the statutes under discussion the authorities
were divided on the problems resulting from taking a bill of lading to
shipper's order.
This essay is concerned merely with the interpretation of the statute
and it is therefore unnecessary to discuss cases decided where the statute
was not in force. It is enough to say that the basic idea of the statutory rule
was contained in some decisions ": and I believe that they represent the sound
' Section 22 (a) is applicable to both situations. "Where delivery of the goods has been
made to the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance of the contract and the property
in the goods has been retained by the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of
his obligations under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk from the time of such
delivery."
'o The Sales Act, following in this respect the English Sale of Goods Act, which in turn
followed the usage of English courts, uses the word "property" to indicate ownership as
between buyer and seller, while the use of the word "title" is confined to ownership good also
as against third parties. The distinction is chiefly important, because a seller who retains
possession, although he has transferred to the buyer the "property in the goods" may either
by a rightful sale to enforce a lien, or by a tortious sale with delivery to a third person, trans-
fer "title".
'Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N. Y. 413, 417, 135 N. E. 834, 835
(1922). Cardozo, J., speaking for the court, said: "We think, however, that the statute in
the provisions above quoted is declaratory of the rule at common law. There was, indeed,
more or less of uncertainty in the common law decisions, for general statements that there
was reservation of the property if the bill of lading was made out to the order of the con-
signor were not always coupled with the qualification that the property, if it would otherwise
be divested, might be deemed to be retained as security, and nothing more (Williston, Sales
§ 284, supplemented by the same author's review of the authorities in 34 Harvard Law Review
751). There were cases, none the less, where the qualification was not ignored (Browne v.
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view, apart from statute. As to the effect of the statute, the writer of the
note in the REVIEW admits that if surrounding circumstances other than
"shipment" disclose an intent either to transfer or withhold ownership it is
clear that in the former case only a security title, and in the latter case full
ownership, is retained. He adds: "The important problem, however-one
which is covered, but, it is submitted, not successfully treated by Section
20 (2) is the rather common case in which there is no evidence other than
the fact that a bill of lading was taken out to the vendor's order at the time
of shipment." The answer is twofold:
I. Such a case cannot occur. There will always be other evidence.
Either the goods were sent in fulfilment of an order or contract, or they were
not; if sent in fulfilment of an order or contract they either comply therewith
both as to the quality and quantity of the goods and the method of shipment
or they do not; either the place of delivery fixed by agreement or legal pre-
sumption is the place of shipment or the place of destination. It is true that
difficult questions of fact arise which make it necessary to indulge in pre-
sumptions. The rules of presumption for ascertaining intention are stated
in Section 19.
2. If it were possible to have a case with no other evidence of intention
than the form of the bill of lading, the answer to the problem is also easy.
Full ownership at the outset was in the seller and anyone who asserts that
it has left him has the burden of proof. The fact that proper goods were
shipped in a proper method in fulfilment of an order or contract will ordi-
narily sustain that burden, unless the seller was required by contract or offer
to deliver at the place of destination.
It may be added that if there were no bills of lading, and the goods were
simply delivered to a bailee for transmission to a buyer, the court in case of
dispute would have to decide who was the owner. It should have precisely
the same question before it when dealing with the second sentence of Section
20 (2): "But if except for the form of the bill of lading, the property would
have passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the seller's property in
the goods shall be deemed to be only for the purpose of securing perform-
ance by the buyer of his obligations under the contract." The data for deter-
Hare, 3 H. & N. 484, 4 H. & N. 822 (I858) ; Inglis v. Stock, io App. Cas. 263 (885) ; Joyce
v. Swann, I7 C. B. [N. s.] 83 (1864) ; Dows v. Nat. Exch. Bk. of Milwaukee, 9i U. S. 618,
634 (1875) ; Higgins v. Murray, 73 N. Y. 252, 255 (1878) ; Farmers & Mechanics Nat. Bk.
of Buffalo v. Logan, 74 N. Y. 568, 579, 58I, 58a (1878); Williston, supjra; Benjamin, Sales
[5th ed.] p. 386). The framers of the statute extracted from uncertain judgments the rule
which they found to be in principle the soundest, with the purpose, here at least, to codify,
but not to change. The record does not inform us that a different rule has been established
by the courts of California. In the absence of such a showing, we accept the codification as
a statement of the rule at common law. Doubts, if there are any, imay well be resolved in
favor of the ruling that will make for the larger uniformity.
"We hold then that the risk of transit was the buyer's, whether the bill o.f lading was
made out to him or to the seller."
See also as to the decisions before the statute. Note (1929) 29 CoL. L. REv. 1oo.
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mining whether the property would have passed are, as has been stated, laid
down in Section i.
The writer of the note, however, thinks it necessary to limit the effect
of the reservation in Section 20, quoted above. He argues that the reserva-
tion applies only to cases in which there is "outside and independent evidence
tending to show that the parties contemplated the passing of title." This is
true if by "outside and independent evidence" is understood outside and inde-
pendent of the form of the bill of lading (as stated in the statute), not out-
side and independent of the fact of shipment. But this is not his meaning;
he contends as follows, that the shipment cannot be used to show an intention
to reserve only a security title.
"Admittedly the sole basis for the rule that delivery to a carrier
raises a presumption of an intention to pass title, is that in the absence
of other evidence of intention, the probabilities are in favor of an inten-
tion then to make a final appropriation to the bargain. The delivery
is valuable, therefore, only in so far as it reveals such an intention.
Where, however, the vendor by taking out a bill of lading to his own
order, explains with what thought the delivery was made, both his acts
should be considered as one. It is erroneous, therefore, to think of the
matter as though delivery to the carrier raised a presumption which was
rebutted by the form of the bill of lading." 12
There are two answers to this argument:
i. The words of the statute are controlling and they clearly require
that the form of the bill of lading be removed from the facts, and that the
other facts (and this means all the facts except that by the terms of the bill
of lading the goods are consigned to the seller) be considered in determining
where the ownership would lie. The words of the statute do not allow both
shipment and the form of the bill to be considered as one. If the meaning
that is sought to be put upon the Act in order to establish the contention that
it does not lay down a rule covering the problem that it purports to had been
intended, the statute would have said "except for the fact of shipment under
the bill of lading" instead of "except for the form of the bill of lading".
2. If the words of the statute were ambiguous, they should be given the
meaning here contended for. If the statute had not yet been drawn, and
the question were how it should be drawn, the proper answer would be to
draw it so that only the fact that the bill of lading is drawn to the seller or
his order should be disregarded, and all other facts including shipment to
the buyer, the propriety of the shipment in view of the seller's relations with
the buyer, as well as all other pertinent facts, should be considered in deter-
mining whether full ownership or a security title has been retained.
" (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. at 886, n. 13.
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It is the primary presumption of the law of sales that the property
passes as soon as the parties have come to an agreement and the goods are
specified.' 3 No point is better settled as an application of this than that
delivery of goods in accordance with an order or contract to a carrier or
other bailee for transmission to the buyer ordinarily effects an immediate
transfer of the property, unless the order or contract requires the seller to
deliver the goods at destination.' 4 Where the seller consigns the goods to
himself or to his own order the rule is qualified, but the extent of the qualifi-
cation should be no greater than is necessary to fulfil the seller's purpose in
taking the bill of lading in that form. This purpose is not inconsistent with
an intent to make a final and immediate appropriation of the goods to the
order or contract. There is the added purpose to retain security for the
price; but the law is perfectly well able to effectuate the double purpose of
retaining a title for security and at the same time of transferring the bene-
ficial ownership.' 5
The writer of the note cites two cases in support of his contention that
under the statute complete ownership is retained by the seller unless there is
evidence of intention to the contrary independent of the "shipment", one from
Maryland " and one from Louisiana, in addition to the Louisiana case upon
which the note was written.'
7
It is of course true, and in accordance with my contention, that all perti-
nent facts should be considered. The fact that in a particular case there were
other facts indicative of intention beside the mere fact of shipment lends no
support to the contention that some such facts are essential, unless the court
so states.
The Maryland court certainly made no such statement. Its decision
is neither opposed to the rule of the Uniform Sales Act, nor did the court
after quoting its provisions find difficulty in applying them in accordance
with the intention of the draftsman. The problem before the court was, in
whom the title would have been if the form of the bill of lading, which ran
to the order of the seller, were disregarded. The court accordingly consid-
ered the other facts that are made important by Section 19 of the Sales Act
" Uz 'IFoi SALEs Acr § ig, rules i and 4.
" WILL.STON, SALES §§ 278-280.
" Blackburn, J., to whom the development of the English law of sales is much indebted,
said in Anderson v. Morice, L. R. 1o C. P. 6op, 61g (1875) : "In the present case, however, the
real question is, at whose risk was it? and we do not, therefore, attach any weight to the
stipulation that the seller was to attach the shipping documents to the drafts, thereby
certainly preserving to the sellers a lien on the goods till the drafts were accepted
and the bill of lading handed over, and perhaps preserving! in them, till then, the property, so
as to enable them to confer a title on a purchaser for value without notice as good; in equity,
and preferable at law to that of Anderson. This would not preventthe risk from being on
the purchaser from the time the loading was complete."
2GRylance v. James Walker Co., 129 Md. 475, 99 AtI. 59/ (1916).
2' State v. Federal Sales Co., 172 La. 922, 136 So. 4 (1931) ; Gerde-Newman v. Louisiana
Stores, supra note 2.
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(Section 40 of the Maryland Code) in order to determine in whom was
the property in the goods; and said:
"It appears from the agreed statement of facts, and from the in-
voice offered in evidence by the plaintiff that the goods were to be deliv-
ered to the defendant in Baltimo-e and that the freight was to be paid by
the plaintiff. It would seem, therefore, clear that under rules four
and five [of Section 40] and Section 41 the plaintiff by the terms of
the appropriation of the goods to the contract reserved the property
therein. Under rule five the property in the goods did not pass to the
buyer upon delivery of the goods to the carrier, and as under the bill
of lading the goods were deliverable to the order of the seller, he thereby
reserved both the property and right of possession."' 8
It seems apparent that if there had been no agreement to make the des-
tination of the goods the place of delivery, the court would have said: "Under
rule four the property in the goods would have passed on shipment and the
seller therefore reserved only a security title."
The Louisiana cases would support the contention of the writer of the
note, if the law of sales in Louisiana were identical with the law as codified
in the Sales Act. The importance of this, ancl that there is no such identity,
can easily be shown.
It was the intention of the draftsman and doubtless of the Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws that Section 40 of the Bills of Lading Act
as well as Section 20 of the Sales Act should have the effect that I have
endeavored to state; but in neither Act can the section when taken alone
be completely effective, since it does not itself provide under what circum-
stances "the property would have passed to the buyer on shipment of the
goods", nor what is the legal effect of the seller's property being "only for
the purpose of securing performance by the buyer under the contract". Sec-
tion 19 of the Sales Act answers the first of these questions; Section 22 the
second of them. The Bills of Lading Act answers neither of them, and the
effect of Section 40 of that Act in any state where the Sales Act is not in
force depends on the answers given to those questions by the unwritten
law of sales. I believe those answers should be the same where the common
law governs the question as where the Sales Act has been enacted, but argu-
ment as to this is possible.
In Louisiana, however, not only has the Sales Act not been enacted,
but the common law of sales is not there in force. Louisiana law is based
on the civil law and in a recent case 19 a paragraph of the headnote (written
by the court) reads as follows: "Whatever may be the rule in common law
States, in Louisiana we do not recognize 'divided incidents of ownership'
's Supra note 16, at 482, 99 AtI. at 599-
California Fruit Exchange v. Meyer, Inc., 8 La. App. 198, 116 So. 575 (1927).
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subsisting in the buyer and seller of personal property. Here the perfection
of a contract of sale confers upon the buyer full, absolute and exclusive
dominion over the thing sold." Louisiana cases, therefore, interpreting
Section 40 of the Bills of Lading Act are not pertinent when the meaning
of the second sentence of Section 20 (2) of the Sales Act is in question.
Section 20 of the Sales Act of course recognizes the possibility of
divided ownership, and where the Act has been passed the courts must recog-
nize that possibility. Section 22 20 enacts one consequence of divided owner-
ship, namely, that the risk of loss rests not on the seller who retains a security
title, but on the buyer.
21
It is true that even where the Act is in force the interest of the seller
has been sometimes referred to as a lien or right of possession. In the
cases where this was done the consequence was not harmful, and the distinc-
tion between the lien of a seller of goods and the interest of a seller with a
bill of lading to his order after the beneficial interest in the goods has passed
to the buyer is not great. The legal interest and powers of an unpaid seller
in possession of goods are so extensive under the law generally prevailing
in the United States and are so much greater than a mere privilege of with-
holding possession until the price has been paid, that practical trouble will
not often be caused. Distinctions in terminology, however, are desirable.
Not only under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, enacted by more than
half the states, but also under the Federal Pomerene Act which is applicable
to all interstate bills, an innocent purchaser for value from one who has
stolen an indorsed bill of lading to "seller's order, notify" would acquire
an indefeasible title to the goods. In view of this it does not seem proper
to say that the buyer acquires title on shipment, and that the seller retains
merely a lien.
The seller's interest is more accurately described as a lien when goods
are consigned to the buyer's order, but the bill of lading, without which
he cannot obtain the goods, is retained as security for payment of the price.
Decisions in states where the Sales Act is in force in no instance suggest
the view that the beneficial interest of the buyer can be established only upon
facts exclusive of the shipment. The risk has been held to be on the buyer
in several well considered cases, in accordance with the interpretation of the
Act intended by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as previously
stated.
22
Quoted supra note 9.
The distinction under the Act between "the property in the goods" and "title" (see note
io) also involves such recognition.
' Alderman Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brakes Co., 92 Conn. 419, lO3 Atl. 267
(I918) ; Standard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., sapra note ii; Kellogg v. Hewitt,
133 Misc. 609, 233 N. Y. Supp. 94 (1929). See also Maffei v. Ginocchio, 299 Ill. 254, 132
N. E. 518 (12i); Alberti v. Associated Fruit Co., 238 Ill. App. I (1925); Glanzer v. J. K.
Armsby Co., IOO Misc. 476, 165 N. Y. Supp. ioo6 (1917).
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The respective interests of the buyer and the seller under the conditions
supposed are important not only with referencq to the risk of loss, but with
reference to the seller's right to recover the full price on tender of the bill
of lading. The question was involved in a decision of the New York Court
of Appeals,23 reversing the decision of the Appellate Division.2 4  The
Court of Appeals allowed recovery. This right is certainly not so clearly
stated in the Sales Act as the seller's right to recover where the goods
are lost. I think, however, that the decision of the upper court is sound,
although there is no specific provision in the statute that authorizes
it. The seller's right to recover the price is stated in Section 63. None of
the three paragraphs of this section specifically covers the case. The only
one possibly appropriate, Subsection (i), allows recovery where "the prop-
erty in the goods has passed". In the section of definitions, "property"
is defined as "general property in goods and not merely a special property".
The Appellate Division, therefore, rightly held that Subsection (I) must be
confined in its operation to cases where the general property had passed; and
the able opinion of Smith, J., for that court is based on the premise that the
three situations stated in Section 63 in which the seller can recover the price
must be regarded as excluding all others.
Reasonable as this argument seems, it loses most of its force when it
is shown from other provisions of the Act that Section: 63 does not state all
cases where the price is recoverable; though it may, I confess, not unjustly
be made a ground of criticism of the draftsmanship of the Act that such is
the case. The corresponding section of the English Act,25 from which Sec-
tion 63 of the American Act was taken with some changes, is doubtless ex-
clusive; but the provisions of Sections 20 26 and 22 27 in the American Act
regarding the retention of a security title, and its effect on the risk of loss,
have no parallel in the English statute. Section 22 plainly states that where
delivery has been made to the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, and the
property in the goods has been retained by the seller merely for security, the
risk of loss rests on the buyer. The only way that risk is or can be enforced
when the goods are lost is by an action for the price. There should be no
doubt, therefore, that by virtue of this section a seller under an ordinary
conditional sale or one who has shipped goods correctly under a bill of lading
to "seller's order, notify" can recover the price, although the situation is
not covered by Section 63.
'Rosenberg Bros. v. F. S. Buffum Co., 234 N. Y. 338, 137 N. E. 609 (1922). See also
Kellogg v. Hewitt, supra note 22; Norbom Engineering Co. v. Cox, 12O Wash. 675, 208 Pac.
87 (1922).
I99 App. Div. 482, 191 N. Y. Supp. 788 (r9).
Section 49.
Quoted in the text, supra page i.
Quoted supra note 9.
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The reason that justifies this statutory provision allowing recovery of
the price in spite of even an express condition in the contract between the
parties that the price shall be payable only on transfer to the buyer of full
ownership is that substantial performance has been rendered by the seller and
exact fulfilment of the remainder has become impossible without his fault.
28
The same reason is applicable where the seller similarly retains a security title
and his inability to complete full performance is due not to accident but to the
buyer's own fault in refusing a tender. There is indeed stronger reason
for excusing exact performance, where the buyer is at fault than where
accidental mischance is the cause of the seller's inability.
It would have been better draftsmanship if a special paragraph covering
the situation had been inserted in Section 63. It seems, however, that a
court should regard the provision in regard to the effect of retaining a
security title on the risk of loss as affording a proper inference that preven-
tion by the buyer of full performance should have the same effect in permit-
ting recovery of the price as prevention by chance.
The two consequences of the divided ownership of buyer and seller
that have thus far been discussed-namely, risk of loss and right to recover
the price-favor the seller, but the possession of an interest in the goods as
soon as they are delivered to the carrier has a compensating advantage to
the buyer. The New York Appellate Division said of the effect of the Sales
Act on the buyer's right under such a shipment as is under discussion, "A
contract right could not be enforced by specific performance. But the buyer in
such a case as this could, at any time, tender the purchase price and recover
the goods under the special property right which he has under this pro-
vision." 29
If either the seller or the buyer become bankrupt, it is obvious that then
also the fact that the buyer has a property interest becomes important.
' The propriety of this is illustrated in other cases besides those where a security title
has been retained. Thus, where goods were shipped from a distancel and the contract ex-
pressly provided that the price would be payable two months after delivery, and the goods
were lost in transit, the buyer was allowed to recover the price. Alexander v. Gardner, I
Bing. 671 (N. C. 1835). See also Upson v. Holmes, 51 Conn. 5oo (1884) ; Fee v. Emporium
Lumber Co., 5o Pa.-Super. 557 (1912). This is in accordance with the general principle that
where a debt has arisen a condition relating to the time of payment is dispensed with if per-
formance is impossible. WILLISTON, SALES § 301.
=' Supra note 24, at 486, 191 N. Y. Supp. at 790. See also Rudin v. King-Richardson
Co., 311 Ill. 513, 143 N. E. ig8 (1924).
As a consequence of the buyer's interest in the goods, it was held in Pennsylvania R. Co.
v. Bank of U. S., 214 App. Div. 410, 212 N. Y. Supp. 437 (1925)' that where the carrier by
mistake delivered the goods to the buyer who had not paid the price or acquired the order
bill of lading and the buyer resold the goods to an innocent purchaser, this purchaser obtained
an indefeasible title.
